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ABSTRACT 
 
 
There is much regulatory and standards work in the area of network security, 
especially in wireless network. The wireless LAN standard IEEE 802.11b 
provides a mechanism for authentication and encryption. This paper describes 
the security of Wireless Local Area Networks based on the IEEE 802.11 
standard. Such networks are also known as Wi-Fi Networks or WLANs. We have 
analyzed different tools that used, to attack a wireless network. We have 
successfully detect different types of attack and found some flaws in WLAN.  We 
conclude this research with several recommendations that will help improve 
security at a wireless deployment site. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Overview of WLAN: 
 
Wireless LAN [1] is a member of the IEEE 802 family of specifications for Local 
Area Networks which allows computers to get connected to a network through 
wireless. And because of wireless is a shared medium, everything that is 
transmitted or received over a wireless network can be intercepted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1 Characteristics of different version of wireless network protocols. 
 
A survey had found that about 70% of wireless network have no security at all. 
Among them IEEE 802.11b [2] is the most popular and widely used protocol in 
wireless arena. So, we choose 802.11b and it’s really important to ensure 
security in WLAN. 
 
 
1.2 How does WLAN work? 
 
There are two basic modes of operation specified in the standard. The most 
commonly used mode is the infrastructure mode. The infrastructure mode allows 
for either one of the entities to be an access point. 
 
In ad-hoc mode all entities are considered clients. Ad-hoc mode may also be 
referred to as independent mode. Stations in ad-hoc mode participate in an ad-
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hoc network, likewise if they are in infrastructure mode they participate in an 
infrastructure network. Interface of a client or access point contains a radio and 
an antenna. To avoid interference and allow networks to operate in the same 
locations, IEEE 802.11 specifies groups of frequencies that may be utilized by a 
network. 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
Methodology 
 
 
 
2.1 Working Methods: 
 
Our Methodology of solving the security problems are as follows: 
 
 Setup a Lab environment.(AP, Valid client, attacker.) 
 Analyzing well-known attacking tools. 
 Trace data sent and received by attacking tools. 
 Analyze captured frame to detect attacks type. 
 Give solution based on that recognized attacks. 
  
 
We had configured and Access Point, one valid client and an attacker. We also 
successfully transferred and received a fixed amount of data between the AP and 
the client. Attacker use different tools to gain access to AP and meanwhile we 
trace the data coming in and going out from AP. 
 
 
2.2 Analyzed Tools: 
 
Tools we have used are: analyzed tools 
 
“Tehereal” for tracing data sent by attacking tools 
“Wireshark” to sniff network 
“NetStumbler” to test WLAN sniffing 
“Kismet” to test passive sniffing 
“Wellenreiter” for WLAN MAC spoofing 
“AirSnrot” for WEP cracking 
“AirJack” to test Man-In-the-Middle attack  
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CHAPTER III 
 
Analyzing Wi-Fi Network Traffic 
 
 
3.1 Overview 
 
Every packet transmitted in Wi-Fi networks contains bits of information used to 
maintain the various layers of the communication. Although packets may be 
encrypted in Wi-Fi networks, they still have plaintext headers. The headers are 
valuable to anyone analyzing the network. The entire MAC (Media Access 
Control) frame displayed in the above figure is easily available to user-space 
tools in Linux. All packets in a Wi-Fi network conform to the MAC frame format. 
The Frame Control field specifies which type of payload the MAC frame 
transports. There are three main types of packets and many subtypes.  
 
 Data Frames – Carry Higher Level Protocol data. 
 Control Frames – RTS, CTS, ACK etc. 
 
RTS stands for Request to send. That means When Source want to send data to 
destination RTS frame is sent. 
 
CTS stand for clear to send. When the destination wants to say the source that, it 
is ready to receive. 
 
 Management Frames – Beacon, Probe, Association, Authentication, De-
authentication etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1 Basic WLAN MAC Frame Format [3] 
 
 
In this frame 2 bytes sequence number is important. 
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 Fig. 3.2 Basic WLAN Frame sequence number 
 
 
The IEEE dedicated two bytes of every 802.11 frame for sequence control fields: 
four bits for a fragment number and 12 bits for a sequence number. When 
management or data frames need to be fragmented they are transmitted in 
portions with a constant sequence number and incrementing fragment numbers 
for each portion of the packet. We will again focus on sequence number in 
FakeAP detection, Man-In-Middle attack detection. 
 
 
 
3.2   Information about Data frame [3] 
 
WEP or WPA encryption: B14 = 1 
 
Type of payload: E.g. if the destination address is the broadcast address, and 
the size of the payload is 68 bytes, then it is very likely to be an Address 
Resolution Protocol (ARP) request. 
 
 
Only data packets with Frame Capability:  
ToDS = 1 and 
FromDS = 1, are transmitted. 
 
MAC address of access point:  
In MAC header: Address 1, 2 or 3. 
 
MAC address of mobile stations:  
In MAC header: Address 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
 
MAC address of wired stations: 
In MAC header: Address 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
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3.3   Information about Control frames [3] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.3 Control frame field. 
 
Network is part of a WDS:  
ToDS = 1 and FromDS = 1. 
 
Network is in ad-hoc mode:  
ToDS = 0 and FromDS = 0; and Type = Data. 
 
NeNetwork is in infrastructure mode:  
ToDS = 1 or FromDS = 1; and Type = Data. 
 
 
3.4   Information about Management frames [3] 
 
Some management frames transmit many parameters about the network. The 
beacon frame is one of them. Access points will broadcast beacon frames to 
inform stations that they are available. The frames provide enough information 
for a client to be able to join the network. However management frames are 
strictly used to administer the network connections. They do not send any data 
from the application layer. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.4 Management frame field. 
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Network is in ad-hoc mode: B0 = 0 and B1 = 1. 
 
WEP is required: B4 = 1. 
 
Beacon interval: is the time between each transmitted beacon frame 
(typically100*1024µs = 100ms).  
 
Service Set Identity (SSID) [4]: a string of maximum 32 bytes/ characters that 
gives a human readable identification of a Wi-Fi network. It also serves another 
purpose to group together multiple access points to form a network of 
collaborating access points (AP). Supported rates: a”list” of supported transmit 
rates in the network. 
 
Extended supported rates: other supported rates. 
 
Channel: the channel the network is operating on. 
 
Network is in infrastructure mode: B0 = 1 and B1 = 0. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.5 Information available from an analysis of Wi-Fi frames Size  
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Fig. 3.6 this figure illustrates the basic protocols and flow of frames when 
connecting to an access point 
 
First the client will detect access points either by sending a probe request and 
receiving a probe response, or purely by looking at the beacon frames frequently 
transmitted by an access point. Upon discovery, the client may try to authenticate 
to the access point. If successfully authenticated, the client may try to associate 
with the access point by sending an association request. If permitted by the 
access point the client will receive a positive association response. WEP is 
skipped here (open system authentication is used), and the real authentication is 
performed after association. 
 
3.5 Frame formats: 
 
In wireless network communication there are two types of frame available.  
 
 Long preamble: Compatible with legacy IEEE* 802.11 systems operating 
at 1 and 2 Mbps (Megabits per second) PLCP with long preamble is 
transmitted at 1 Mbps regardless of transmit rate of data frames. Total 
Long Preamble transfer time is a constant at 192 Micro sec. 
 
 Short preamble: is transmitted at 1 Mbps and header at 2 Mbps. Total 
short Preamble transfer time is a constant at 96 micro seconds. Short 
preamble more efficient than long preamble. 
 
The preamble is used to communicate to the receiver that the data is on its way. 
Technically speaking, it is the first portion of the Physical Layer Convergence 
Protocol (PLCP). Each preamble have atmost 2312 bytes of payload. The 
payload allows the receiver to acquire the wireless signal and synchronize itself 
with the transmitter.  
15 
CHAPTER IV 
 
WLAN Security Issue 
 
 
4.1 Overview: 
 
The pictures below shows you a small scenario, where the attacker can take 
position. As it is a wireless network, an attacker can took position in anywhere 
the network available. It can be an individual try to gain access to AP, or may be 
a fake AP try to be the part of a network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1 Parking Lot attacker in WLAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2 a rouge Access point 
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4.2 Wireless LAN sniffing: 
 
Sniffing is much easier to do in wireless network. One doesn’t needs to be 
physically connected to the network to sniff. Generally sniffing is done by a 
sniffing program which copies of a network packet sent by machine A intended to 
be received by machine B. 
 
There are two types of sniffing tools; one is active sniffer and other one passive 
sniffer. Active sniffer uses probe request frames on each channel where it is able 
to detect wireless activity (to avoid blocking the discovery process on frequencies 
that are not in use). When an AP comes within range of the client and receives a 
probe request frame it will typically respond with a probe response frame 
containing the network ESSID. Passive sniffer utilizes a completely passive 
method of WLAN discovery known as radio frequency monitoring (RFMON). A 
client with a wireless card that is configured in RFMON mode will be able to 
capture all RF signals on the channels to which it is configured to listen. While in 
RFMON mode, wireless clients are unable to transmit any frames; their cards are 
only able to receive, and therefore capture traffic. This limits the client to 
reporting only current or recorded network traffic. 
 
4.2.1 NetSstumbler: 
 
A good example of active sniffer is NetSstumbler. NetStumber is a very popular 
tool for Windows users, utilizing active scanning through the use of probe 
requests sent to a broadcast address with a broadcast BSSID and an unspecified 
ESSID (length of 0). The probe requests are difficult to identify definitively as 
NetStumbler activity since NetStumbler utilizes the active scanning method 
described in the IEEE 802.11 specifications without anomalous characteristics.   
 
 
4.2.2 Kismat: 
 
Kismet [5] detects the presence of wireless networks, including those with hidden 
SSIDs. It can discover and report the IP range used for a particular wireless 
network, as well as its signal and noise levels. Kismet can also capture or “sniff” 
all network management data packets for an available wireless network. Kismet 
works by putting the wireless client adapter into RF monitor mode. While in so-
called “rfmon” mode, the wireless client is not (and cannot be) associated with 
any access point. Instead, it listens to all wireless traffic. Consequently, your 
wireless card cannot maintain a functional network connection while under 
Kismet control.  
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4.3  WLAN MAC address spoofing : 
 
The phrase “MAC address spoofing” [6] in this context relates to an attacker 
altering the Manufacturer assigned MAC address to any other value. Nearly all 
802.11 cards in use permit their MAC addresses to be altered, often with full 
support and drivers from the manufacturer. Using Linux open-source drivers, a 
user can change their MAC address with the ifconfig tool. Windows users are 
commonly permitted to change their MAC address by selecting the properties of 
their network card drivers in the network control panel applet. 
 
An attacker may choose to alter their MAC address for several reasons, 
including obfuscating their presence on a network, to bypass access control lists, 
or to impersonate an already authenticated user. Each is explained in greater 
detail as follows: 
 
 
4.3.1 Obfuscating network presence:  
 
An attacker might choose to change their MAC address in an attempt to evade 
network intrusion detection systems (NIDS). A common example is an attacker 
executing a brute- force attack script with a random MAC address for each 
successive connection attempt.  
 
4.3.2 Bypassing access control lists:  
 
Used as a basic form of access control on WLANs, administrators typically 
have the option to configure access points or neighboring routers to permit 
only registered MAC addresses to communicate on the network. An attacker 
could circumvent this form of access control by passively monitoring the 
network and generate a list of MAC addresses that are authorized to 
communicate. With the list of authorized MAC addresses in hand, an attacker 
is free to set their MAC address to any of the authorized addresses, bypassing 
the intended security mechanism. 
 
4.3.3 Authenticated user impersonation:  
 
Certain hardware WLAN security authentication devices rely on matching user 
authentication credentials to the source MAC address of a client. After a user 
has successfully authenticated, the security gateway permits traffic based on a 
dynamic list of authorized MAC addresses. An attacker wishing to avoid the 
security of the device, s/he only needs to monitor the network activity for an 
authorized client’s MAC address. Then alter their MAC address to match the 
authenticated client before communicating on the network. 
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4.4  Fake Access Point: 
 
FakeAP [7] is a Perl script that utilizes the HostAP client drivers and a dictionary 
word list to generate 802.11 beacon frames in an attempt to fool NetStumbler, 
Kismet and other wireless LAN discovery applications. In order to make the 
generated traffic appear valid, FakeAP supports changing transmit signal 
strength and MAC addresses for each unique SSID advertisement. The authors 
of FakeAP were resourceful in their MAC address generation code, using a list 
of allocated OUIs [8] with three trailing random octets to generate a MAC 
address that will escape the anomalous MAC prefix detection method described 
above. 
 
  
4.5 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP): 
 
WEP [9] is a shared-secret key encryption system used to encrypt packets 
transmitted between a station and an AP. WEP incorporates two main types of 
protection: a secret key and encryption. The secret key is a simple 5- or 13-
character password that is shared between the access point and all wireless 
network users. This key is all-important to WEP in that it is also used in the 
encryption process to uniquely scramble each packet of information with a 
unique password. This ensures that if a hacker cracks one packets key, he 
won’t be able to view every packet’s information.  
 
To do this, WEP defines a method to create a unique secret key for each 
packet using the 5- or 13-characters of the pre-shared key and three more 
psuedo-randomly selected characters picked by the wireless hardware. For 
example, let’s assume that our pre-shared key was “games”. This word would 
then be merged with “abc” to create a secret key of “abcgames”, which would 
be used to encrypt the packet. The next packet would still use “games”, but 
concatenate it this time with “xyz” to create a new secret key of “xyzgames”. 
This process would randomly continue during the transmission of data. This 
changing part of the secret key is called the Initialization Vector because it 
initializes the encryption process for each packet of data sent.There exists 
some WEP cracking software to crack WEP. Normally it will take hours to check 
and crack WEP secret key depending on how many bits it used to encrypt. An 
example of a WEP cracking tool is AirSnort. 
 
It is important to understand the basics of XOR when discussing RC4 and WEP 
because it is used in the encryption process to create the encrypted data. XOR 
is just a simple binary comparison between two bytes that produces another 
byte as a result of a simple process. In short, it takes each corresponding bit in 
a byte and compares them by asking “Is this bit different from that bit?” If the 
answer is yes, the result is 1; otherwise it is a 0. Figure illustrates below. 
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Table 4.1 XOR Byte Comparison 
 
 
4.5.1 AirSnort: 
 
The most commonly used tool for WEP key extraction is the Linux program 
AirSnort. An intruder using AirSnort would surreptitiously collect wireless 
network traffic of the target network. When enough frames have been 
collected from the network, AirSnort can determine the WEP key of the 
network by examining the “weak” frames. It usually takes only a few hours to 
collect enough frames. Manufacturers have released updated firmware that 
addresses the transmission of such weak frames; however, a network remains 
vulnerable if a client continues to use an outdated wireless network adapter.  
 
 
4.6   Man in the middle attack: 
 
Assume that station B was authenticated with C, a legitimate AP.  Attacker X is a 
laptop with two wireless cards.  Through one card, he will present X as an AP.  
Attacker X sends De-authentication frames to B using the C’s MAC address as 
the source, and the BSSID he has collected.  B gets de-authenticated and begins 
a scan for an AP and may find X on a channel different from C.  There is a race 
condition between X and C.  If B associates with X, the MITM attack succeeded.  
X will re-transmit the frames it receives from B to C, and the frames it receives 
from C to B after suitable modifications.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Original bit XOR bit Resulting bit 
1 1 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 1 
0 1 1 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.3 Man in the middle attack. 
 
The package of tools called AirJack:  
 
 Includes a program called monkey_jack that automates the MITM attack.  This is 
programmed well so that the odds of it winning in the race condition mentioned 
above are improved. Attacker on machine X inserts himself between two hosts B 
and C by (i) poisoning B so that ARP poisoning: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.4. Denial of service using AirJack 
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4.6.1 AirJack: 
 
AirJack is a suite of tools that is designed as a proof-of-concept to establish 
layer 1 man- in-the-middle attacks against 802.11 networks. Included in this 
toolset is “wlan-jack”, a tool to perform a denial-of-service attack against users 
on a target wireless network; it works by sending spoofed de-authenticate 
frames to a broadcast address, purportedly from the network access point’s 
MAC address. 
 
Using the wlan-jack tool is simple; an attacker only has to be in range of the 
clients on the wireless network to be effective. This tool works because the 
clients that receive the de-authenticate frames believe they have been sent 
from the access point they are currently associated with. Since wlan-jack has 
to spoof the MAC address of the target access point, we have the opportunity 
to identify this traffic as anomalous based on sequence number analysis. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
Security Flaws Detectaction 
 
5.1 NetStumbler detection 
 
In a posting to the Kismet Wireless mailing list on March 28 2002, Mike Craik first 
identified a unique pattern that can be used to identify NetStumbler traffic. LLC-
encapsulated frames generated by NetStumbler will use an organizationally 
unique identifier (OUI) of 0x00601d and protocol identifier (PID) of 0x0001. 
NetStumber also uses a data payload size of 58 bytes containing a unique string 
that can be used to identify the version of NetStumbler.   
 
NetStumble    Payload String 
 
3.2.0 Flurble gronk bloopit, bnip 
Frundletrune 
3.2.3 All your 802.11b are belong to us 
3.3.0 intentionally blank 1 
 
Table 5.1 Payload string of different version of netstumbler 
 
It is possible to detect NetStumbler by analyzing the probe requests coming from 
clients with above like format. So, 
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 "If probe request frame = (wlan.fc.type_subtype = 0x08 and llc.oui = 0x00601d 
and llc.pid = 0x0001) and (data[14:4] = 69:6e:74:65 and  data[18:4] = 
6E:74:69:6f and data[22:4] = 6e:61:6c:6c  and data[26:4] = 79:20:62:6c and 
data[30:4] =              61:6e:6b:20) then NetStumbler detected". 
 
The following detect is taken from NetStumbler version 3.2.3 using a Windows 
2000 host for discovery using ethereal [10]. 
 
IEEE 802.11 
Type/Subtype: Data (32) 
Frame Control: 0x0908 
Version: 0 
 
Type: Data frame (2) 
Subtype: 0 
Flags: 0x9 
 
DS status: Frame is entering DS (To DS: 1 From DS: 0) (0x01) 
.... .0.. = Fragments: No fragments 
.... 1... = Retry: Frame is being retransmitted 
...0 .... = PWR MGT: STA will stay up 
..0. .... = More Data: No data buffered 
.0.. .... = WEP flag: WEP is disabled 
0... .... = Order flag: Not strictly ordered 
 
Duration: 258 
BSS Id: 00:50:18:07:13:92 (ADVANCED_07:13:92) 
Source address: 00:02:2d:52:cb:27 (Agere_52:cb:27) 
Destination address: 00:50:18:07:13:92 (ADVANCED_07:13:92) 
Fragment number: 0 
Sequence number: 3057 
 
Logical-Link Control 
DSAP: SNAP (0xaa) 
IG Bit: Individual 
SSAP: SNAP (0xaa) 
CR Bit: Command 
 
Control field: U, func = UI (0x03) 
000. 00.. = Unnumbered Information 
.... ..11 = Unnumbered frame 
 
Organization Code: Unknown (0x00601d) 
Protocol ID: 0x0001 
Data (58 bytes) 
23 
 
 
0000 00 00 00 00 41 6c 6c 20 79 6f 75 72 20 38 30 32   ....All your 802 
0010 2e 31 31 62 20 61 72 65 20 62 65 6c 6f 6e 67 20   .11b are belong 
0020 74 6f 20 75 73 2e 20 20 20 20 20 20 fe ca ba ab     to us. .... 
0030 ad de 0f d0 4f 45 43 45 46 46                                   ....OECEFF 
 
 
 
5.2  Wellenreiter detection:  
 
There are several tools to do the MAC spoofing attack. Among them Wellenreiter 
[11] is most useful and popular among Linux users. Wellenreiter is a Perl/Gtk+ 
application for use on Linux systems. Wellenreiter only supports network 
discovery through RFMON packet capture, but includes some additional features 
using a second 802.11 network card, including ESSID brute- forcing and 
automatic network association. It is through these features that we are able to 
identify Wellenreiter-generated traffic. 
 
When an ESSID brute-force attack is initiated, Wellenreiter will use the Linux 
"iwconfig" program to temporarily set its ESSID to 
"this_is_used_for_wellenreiter". The MAC address will also be set to a random 
values between “0x00” and “0xFF” and then prepends a leading value of “0x00” 
to avoid generating MAC addresses that conflict with reserved and multicast 
space. A trace of Wellenreiter v1.6 traffic attempting to brute-force the ESSID of 
an access point appears as follows: 
 
scornik:~ $ tethereal –r wellenreiter.dmp –n –R “wlan.fc eq 0x0040” 
167 16.117154 00:03:b7:47:e2:40 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff IEEE 802.11 Probe Request 
168 16.133680 00:03:b7:47:e2:40 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff IEEE 802.11 Probe Request 
171 16.239248 00:84:b9:5a:ce:40 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff IEEE 802.11 Probe Request 
177 16.504359 00:84:b9:5a:ce:40 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff IEEE 802.11 Probe Request 
178 16.538390 00:0e:ef:e0:3d:40 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff IEEE 802.11 Probe Request 
183 16.885264 00:0e:ef:e0:3d:40 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff IEEE 802.11 Probe Request 
185 16.918787 00:a6:8b:cd:f1:40 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff IEEE 802.11 Probe Request 
191 17.270278 00:a6:8b:cd:f1:40 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff IEEE 802.11 Probe Request 
192 17.303924 00:8a:7c:29:56:40 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff IEEE 802.11 Probe Request 
198 17.653241 00:8a:7c:29:56:40 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff IEEE 802.11 Probe Request 
199 17.674149 00:df:f7:a1:8a:40 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff IEEE 802.11 Probe Request 
206 18.041326 00:df:f7:a1:8a:40 -> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff IEEE 802.11 Probe Request 
scornik:~ $ 
 
In this example every second probe request frame appears to be coming from a 
different MAC address, all destined to the broadcast address. If we compare the 
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MAC address prefixes to the allocated OUI listing by the IEEE we discover that 
only one of the five MAC prefixes is listed as being allocated by the IEEE. 
 
With this information, we can detect anomalous MAC addresses based on their 
prefix information. With a current list of allocated OUIs from the IEEE, we can 
monitor network activity and identify the OUIs for MAC addresses that are not 
presently allocated. 
 
Unfortunately, a clever attacker can easily circumvent this detection technique. 
Since the list of allocated OUIs is publicly available, an attacker could modify 
their randomization procedure to build a hash of allocated prefixes and randomly 
select an allocated OUI, and then append a random 24-bit value for the 
remaining three octets of the MAC address. This technique was first 
demonstrated in the FakeAP tool that generates multiple SSID beacon frames 
with varying MAC addresses, power output, and SSID values in an effort to fool 
network discovery applications into thinking they have discovered a plethora of 
wireless networks. Fortunately, we can detect the presence of FakeAP and other, 
more devious WLAN attack tools through WLAN sequence number analysis. 
 
 
5.3 FakeAP detection 
 
We can detect FakeAP activity by monitoring the sequence number value for 
sequential increments with changing source MAC address, BSSID and SSID 
values. In an environment with a dense deployment of wireless access points, we 
would typically see multiple beacon frames from varying source addresses 
containing different SSID names; using FakeAP, we will see similar activity as it 
cycles through its dictionary list of SSID values and random MAC address 
generation procedure. The firmware of the Prism wireless NIC will be indifferent 
to changing wireless parameters, however, maintaining a sequential order to the 
sequence number value.  
 
The following packet capture was generated in a lab environment using FakeAP 
v0.3.1, with the output from tethereal trimmed for brevity: 
 
scornik:~ $ tethereal –r fakeap.dmp –n –R “wlan.fc eq 0x0080” 
 
IEEE 802.11 
Type/Subtype: Beacon frame (8) 
Destination address: ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) 
Source address: 00:02:b3:cb:28:64 (00:02:b3:cb:28:64) 
BSS Id: 00:02:b3:cb:28:64 (00:02:b3:cb:28:64) 
Fragment number: 0 
Sequence number: 2055 
IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN management frame 
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Tagged parameters (22 bytes) 
Tag Number: 0 (SSID parameter set) 
Tag interpretation: macro 
 
IEEE 802.11 
Type/Subtype: Beacon frame (8) 
Destination address: ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) 
Source address: 00:02:a5:a5:75:a5 (00:02:a5:a5:75:a5) 
BSS Id: 00:02:a5:a5:75:a5 (00:02:a5:a5:75:a5) 
Fragment number: 0 
Sequence number: 2056 
IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN management frame 
Tagged parameters (26 bytes) 
Tag Number: 0 (SSID parameter set) 
Tag interpretation: breathing 
IEEE 802.11 
Type/Subtype: Beacon frame (8) 
Destination address: ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) 
Source address: 00:02:a5:a5:75:a5 (00:02:a5:a5:75:a5) 
BSS Id: 00:02:a5:a5:75:a5 (00:02:a5:a5:75:a5) 
Fragment number: 0 
Sequence number: 2057 
IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN management frame 
Tagged parameters (26 bytes) 
Tag Number: 0 (SSID parameter set) 
Tag interpretation: breathing 
 
IEEE 802.11 
Type/Subtype: Beacon frame (8) 
Destination address: ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) 
Source address: 00:02:2d:7d:c5:5f (00:02:2d:7d:c5:5f) 
BSS Id: 00:02:2d:7d:c5:5f (00:02:2d:7d:c5:5f) 
Fragment number: 0 
Sequence number: 2058 
IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN management frame 
Tagged parameters (29 bytes) 
Tag Number: 0 (SSID parameter set) 
Tag interpretation: intercession 
scornik:~ $ 
 
Here we can see that, we see unique source MAC addresses, BSSIDs and 
SSIDs that would normally appear as traffic generated by multiple WLAN access 
points. If we examine the sequence number parameter, however, we see a 
sequential pattern that indicates that this traffic is being generated by a single 
host and not multiple access points. 
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5.4 AirSnort detection: 
 
Examining AirSnort’s source code revealed that it uses a simple algorithm to 
determine if a frame is weak. Weak frames are then added to a pool to be 
analyzed later by another algorithm to determine the WEP key.  
 
The weak frame detection algorithm relies on simple pattern matching of the 
initialization vector (IV) of the frame. The IV itself consists of three bytes. AirSnort 
considers a frame weak if the first byte of the IV has a value between 2 and 16 
inclusive and the second byte has a value of 255. Each three-byte pattern is only 
added once to the pool.  
 
Creating decoys for AirSnort is a simple task. The decoy frames contain mostly 
valid data except that the IV is a randomly generated number that matches the 
criteria described above. Also, at least one byte of “encrypted” data should be 
randomly generated. AirSnort requires only a few such frames and would cease 
capturing frames when the key has been extracted. Our implementation used 
sequential numbers for the third byte while the first byte and encrypted data are a 
single random byte each.  
 
Other required fields are also filled in. First, the frame is marked as an encrypted 
data frame. The BSSID is the actual one configured by the user and the source 
address is also set from this value. The destination is randomized since it is 
ignored by AirSnort. To prevent degradation of the network, the decoy frames 
can only be sent intermittently at a user-controlled rate. Given that the system 
only has to protect the valid network from intrusion, the decoys are broadcasted 
only on the valid channel. 
 
 
5.5 Airjack detection: 
 
In order to detect anomalies in sequence numbers, we need to first establish a 
pattern of legitimate sequence number activity for each MAC address we wish to 
monitor. In the following detect, the sequence numbers for the legitimate source 
MAC “00:e0:63:82:19:c6” are in the range 2966 – 2971. Knowing this pattern, we 
can easily identify the deauthenticate frames as being illegitimate, although they 
purport to have originated from the source MAC “00:e0:63:82:19:c6”. This packet 
capture was generated in a lab environment using AirJack [12] v0.6.2-alpha. 
 
 
iftheker:~ $ tethereal –r airjack.dmp –n –R “wlan.sa eq 00:e0:63:82:19:c6” 
IEEE 802.11 
Type/Subtype: Beacon frame (8) 
Destination address: ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) 
Source address: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
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BSS Id: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
Fragment number: 0 
Sequence number: 2966 
IEEE 802.11 
Type/Subtype: Beacon frame (8) 
Destination address: ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) 
Source address: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
BSS Id: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
Fragment number: 0 
Sequence number: 2967 
IEEE 802.11 
Type/Subtype: Probe Response (5) 
Destination address: 00:60:1d:f0:91:56 (00:60:1d:f0:91:56) 
Source address: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
BSS Id: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
Fragment number: 0 
Sequence number: 2968 
IEEE 802.11 
Type/Subtype: Deauthentication (12) 
Destination address: ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) 
Source address: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
BSS Id: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
Fragment number: 0 
Sequence number: 1335 
IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN management frame 
Fixed parameters (2 bytes) 
Reason code: Previous authentication no longer valid (0x0002) 
IEEE 802.11 
Type/Subtype: Deauthentication (12) 
Destination address: ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) 
Source address: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
BSS Id: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
Fragment number: 0 
Sequence number: 1336 
IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN management frame 
Fixed parameters (2 bytes) 
Reason code: Previous authentication no longer valid (0x0002) 
IEEE 802.11 
Type/Subtype: Beacon frame (8) 
Destination address: ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) 
Source address: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
BSS Id: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
Fragment number: 0 
Sequence number: 2969 
IEEE 802.11 
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Type/Subtype: Probe Response (5) 
Destination address: 00:60:1d:f0:91:56 (00:60:1d:f0:91:56) 
Source address: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
BSS Id: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
Fragment number: 0 
Sequence number: 2970 
IEEE 802.11 
Type/Subtype: Deauthentication (12) 
Destination address: ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) 
Source address: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
BSS Id: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
Fragment number: 0 
Sequence number: 1339 
IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN management frame 
Fixed parameters (2 bytes) 
Reason code: Previous authentication no longer valid (0x0002) 
IEEE 802.11 
Type/Subtype: Probe Response (5) 
Destination address: 00:60:1d:f0:91:56 (00:60:1d:f0:91:56) 
Source address: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
BSS Id: 00:e0:63:82:19:c6 (00:e0:63:82:19:c6) 
Fragment number: 0 
Sequence number: 2971 
iftheker:~ $ 
 
 
We can quickly identify the frames with sequence numbers in the range of 1335-
1339 as illegitimate management traffic. 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
Conclusion 
 
6.1 Conclusion: 
 
Based upon the results from our research efforts and proposed solutions, we feel 
that it’s possible to implement a complete WIDS (Wireless Intrusion Detection 
System) in the application layer based on fingerprinting known attacking tool’s 
attack pattern. It’s almost impossible and not feasible enough to deploy hardware 
intrusion detection system. Thus our future plan is to analyze more attacking 
tools, find their pattern and implement software based complete intrusion 
detection system. 
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